(002) Nietzsche’s “Beyond Good and Evil”, One Paragraph at a Time
I’ve struggled immensely in all my attempts to read and comprehend Nietzsche’s “Beyond Good and Evil”. These blog posts are my attempt to better understand this material. I encourage any corrections or criticisms in the comments.
Chapter One: On the Prejudices of Philosophers
2. “HOW COULD anything originate out of its opposite? For example, truth out of error? or the Will to Truth out of the will to deception? or the generous deed out of selfishness? or the pure sun-bright vision of the wise man out of covetousness? Such genesis is impossible; whoever dreams of it is a fool, nay, worse than a fool; things of the highest value must have a different origin, an origin of THEIR own — in this transitory, seductive, illusory, paltry world, in this turmoil of delusion and cupidity, they cannot have their source. But rather in the lap of Being, in the intransitory, in the concealed God, in the ‘Thing-in-itself — THERE must be their source, and nowhere else!” — This mode of reasoning discloses the typical prejudice by which metaphysicians of all times can be recognized, this mode of valuation is at the back of all their logical procedure; through this “belief” of theirs, they exert themselves for their “knowledge,” for something that is in the end solemnly christened “the Truth.”
At the back of every supposed logical procedure are prejudices. If the metaphysician's stated aim is the pursuit of truth, they presuppose that this aim is “good” and fail to recognize that unconsciously they will steer in the direction of self-deception should it support their prejudice. They fail to recognize the selfish compulsion that sits behind every generous action. Indeed it is an example of their own prejudice to the belief that the origin of things that are deemed “good” is somehow inherent and not projected onto the thing subjectively by some process unbeknownst to them and likely unconscious.
The fundamental belief of metaphysicians is THE BELIEF IN ANTITHESES OF VALUES. It never occurred even to the wariest of them to doubt here on the very threshold (where doubt, however, was most necessary); though they had made a solemn vow, “DE OMNIBUS DUBITANDUM.” For it may be doubted, firstly, whether antitheses exist at all; and secondly, whether the popular valuations and antitheses of value upon which metaphysicians have set their seal, are not perhaps merely superficial estimates, merely provisional perspectives, besides being probably made from some corner, perhaps from below — “frog perspectives,” as it were, to borrow an expression current among painters.
It is a psychological necessity for human beings to think in terms of value, which the metaphysician does not properly recognize and doubt even though they hold to the axiom that one must doubt everything.
It’s here we see a new antithesis of value form between “doubt” and “assurance”. How does one doubt doubt?
In spite of all the value which may belong to the true, the positive, and the unselfish, it might be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life generally should be assigned to pretence, to the will to delusion, to selfishness, and cupidity. It might even be possible that WHAT constitutes the value of those good and respected things, consists precisely in their being insidiously related, knotted, and crocheted to these evil and apparently opposed things — perhaps even in being essentially identical with them.
It might be true that these supposed antitheses of values are reconcilable only within themselves, that the only explanation as to the origin of opposing values lies in some harmonious counterpoint. If “good” cannot exist without “evil”, does that not mean that good arises out of evil? Does evil arise out of good? Are these two opposing forces not somehow identical with each other?
Perhaps! But who wishes to concern himself with such dangerous “Perhapses”! For that investigation one must await the advent of a new order of philosophers, such as will have other tastes and inclinations, the reverse of those hitherto prevalent — philosophers of the dangerous “Perhaps” in every sense of the term. And to speak in all seriousness, I see such new philosophers beginning to appear.
Similar to p.001 Nietzsche reiterates the danger of asking such questions. We can now see intimations of the problem of how human beings create value. Nietzsche believed that a new order of philosophers would need to tackle this issue. It’s been 132 years since this book was published. How do you think we’re doing?
